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Abstract 
What are the effects of party defections on the attitudes of politicians who remain loyal to the party? We 
answer by combining multiple sources of data into a comprehensive novel dataset on parliamentary party 
switching, to estimate how this affects the perceived distance between a politician and his party. Focusing 
on the theory of cognitive dissonance and the black sheep effect, we hypothesise that politicians perceive 
themselves closer to their parties when those parties recently suffered defections. The effect should be 
greater among incumbent politicians as they directly experience divisions, but also among officials 
dissatisfied with the leadership as their dissonance should be stronger. Statistical analyses of data from 
two elite surveys, on a sample of 13,256 politicians belonging to 92 parties that ran in 28 elections held 
between 2005 and 2015 in 14 countries, provide support for our hypotheses and shed light on the 
consequences of intra-party defections. 
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1. Introduction 
For decades, parties have been considered unitary actors. However, we know that divisions and 
disagreements are inherently part of intra-party dynamics. Scholars started to investigate internal 
divisions from many different perspectives, analysing splits in parliamentary roll call votes (Kam 2009), 
party switching and parliamentary defections (Heller and Mershon 2009a), party fissions (Ibenskas 
2017), and disagreement expressed at party conferences (Ceron and Greene 2019; Greene and Haber 
2015) or in parliamentary speeches (Bäck et al. 2016). Recent studies used political elite surveys as 
additional sources of data on intra-party disagreement (Carroll and Kubo 2019; Close et al. 2019; 
Schumacher and Elmelund-Præstekær 2018; Steiner and Mader 2019). 
Starting from this literature, the present paper combines multiple sources of data and provides a novel 
and comprehensive dataset on legislative party switching to examine the impact of parliamentary 
defections on politicians’ beliefs. Disagreement expressed in the answers provided in two elite surveys 
by candidates and Members of Parliament (MPs) forms a basis for such exploration: we will rely mainly 
on the Comparative Candidate Survey using the PartiRep MP Survey as a robustness check. 
The consequences of intra-party division have been largely investigated in the academic literature. 
Scholars argued that intra-party division can be damaging in many ways. Given that party unity is often 
considered as an added value in terms of valence (Clark 2009), public disagreement and defections are 
signals that the party is not able to select the best parliamentary agents and reveal a weakening in the 
chain of responsiveness that goes from voters to their elected representatives. As such, splits and 
defections can undermine voter confidence that the party will provide a stable, consistent and effective 
leadership. This can damage a party’s electoral support (Greene and Haber 2015; Ibenskas 2017) and 
jeopardize its stability and institutionalization (McMenamin and Gwiazda 2011). Parliamentary 
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defections can also alter the balance between government and opposition parties with consequences for 
everyday policymaking. 
Accordingly, parliamentary defections are traumatic events that can alter the attitudes of politicians 
belonging to parties affected by such traumas. In real world politics there are plenty of examples of intra-
party conflicts that generate repeated waves of dissent and defection. One of the latest events concerns 
the feud inside the French Socialist Party (2012-2017), which was affected by repeated episodes of 
parliamentary dissent culminating in the disintegration of the party itself when a number of prominent 
politicians left the party (including the new Head of State Emmanuel Macron and the former Prime 
Minister Manuel Valls). 
Similarly, in countries like Italy, Israel or Japan, defections have been crucial to producing government 
reshuffles, overturning, termination and snap elections. Given that these switches are a source of political 
instability, Prime Ministers overthrown by the treason of individual defectors or splinter groups usually 
consider these episodes as traumatic and, in the subsequent electoral campaigns, they highlight how such 
defectors betrayed the voters’ wills and undermined political accountability and responsiveness. 
So far, scholars have focused mainly on the effects of defections on MPs’ voting behaviour or on party 
performance in the electoral arena, while little attention has been devoted to the consequence that 
parliamentary feud produces inside the party, particularly on the beliefs and attitudes of individual 
politicians. With respect to parliamentary behaviour, some studies analysed how defections produce 
shifts in the ideological position of switchers, who align their preferences with the ideal points of their 
new parliamentary group (Desposato 2009; Hug and Wüest 2011; Nokken 2009). The consequences of 
defections on parties and on MPs who kept their label, however, have been understudied (with few 
important exceptions: Heller and Mershon 2009b; Nokken 2000). These studies suggest that parties 
affected by out-switching may become less heterogeneous (Heller and Mershon 2009b) and that, as a 
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result of the defection of a peer, non-switchers stick to the party line even when they are ideologically 
close to the defectors (Nokken 2000). Investigating whether switching affects the internal cohesion of 
parties is crucial given that intra-party cohesion can influence everyday policy-making and coalition 
formation (Ceron 2016). 
The present paper tries to understand this mechanism from the above perspective, focusing on the beliefs 
of party candidates and MPs rather than on their actual behavior. With the premise that splits represent a 
traumatic experience, and taking into account the psychological effects of a party’s in-group bias 
(Martocchia Diodati 2017; Sacchi et al. 2013), we argue that higher rates of defections strengthen the 
sense of belonging for those who remain so that politicians should perceive themselves to be closer to 
their party. We expect that such effect should be greater among incumbent MPs, as they directly 
experienced the trauma, and among legislators who are dissatisfied with the leadership (Close et al. 
2019), as they will experience a stronger cognitive dissonance, which brings them to align their 
ideological beliefs with their past behaviour (i.e., the decision to stay inside). We test our hypotheses on 
a sample of 13,256 politicians belonging to 92 parties that ran in 28 elections held between 2005 and 
2015 in 14 countries. The results are in line with our expectations and suggest that defections can 
strengthen the cohesion of remaining politicians (including other potential defectors): this makes the out-
switching party more cohesive. By invoking (and highlighting) internal cohesion and coherence, while 
blaming the black sheep, the party leadership can also try to avoid further waves of defections. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses: Party breakups as traumatic events 
2.1 Literature review 
We know that party membership is not static because legislators can always decide to change affiliation. 
Considering party membership as a strategic choice, in every party system there are generic incentives 
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for parties to split and/or to merge (Laver and Benoit 2003). In this framework, every party system is 
therefore potentially unstable.  
This instability can take two forms: collective or individual. Mergers and splits are examples of collective 
divisions, which are not uncommon phenomena in European countries (Ibenskas 2017). Sometimes, 
however, legislators decide to change party independently, swapping their parliamentary affiliation, a 
phenomenon known as “party switching”. The scope of switching varies across Europe: while in certain 
countries it occurs frequently, in other systems, legislators do not change their group often, yet the 
phenomenon is not utterly absent (Heller and Mershon 2009a). Individual defections, splits and mergers 
are therefore all instances of lack of unity within parties and their incidence confirms that party size and 
identity should not be taken for granted between two elections.  
Several studies have tried to understand the determinants of party switching and individual defections. 
On the one hand, scholars highlight the importance of policy motives along with office and electoral 
concerns (Di Virgilio et al. 2012; Heller and Mershon 2005). On the other, attention has been devoted to 
the impact of electoral systems (McLaughlin 2012), regime type (O’Brien and Shomer 2013; Mershon 
and Shvetsova 2013) and party system institutionalization. 
Conversely, other scholars analyse the consequences of defection on the (subsequent) electoral 
competition. Marinova (2016) analyses how party instability – resulting from splits, mergers and 
switching – affects voters and the kind of information they use to evaluate parties. Greene and Haber 
(2015) find that intra-party division negatively affects voters’ perceptions of parties and – as a 
consequence – endangers their electoral support. Similarly, Ibenskas (2017) looks at how parties’ 
electoral support changes after a split and tries to understand what factors might explain the differing 
degrees of success of splinter vis-à-vis rump parties.  
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A different stream of research focuses on the consequences that switching produces on parties and 
individual legislators. Some scholars look at the impact of switching on MPs’ careers. Grose and 
Yoshinaka (2003) show that switching has considerable electoral costs; defectors see a substantial decline 
of votes in the following election. The behavioural consequences of switching have been investigated 
too. Hug and Wüest (2011) evaluated whether defecting produces a shift in the ideological position of 
MPs. They found that indeed switchers alter their ideal points and align preferences with those of their 
new group. This result is in line with Nokken (2009) and Desposato (2009) who found that defectors 
change their roll-call behaviour to match the policy goals of their new party1.  
These studies focus on switchers and their new affiliation, without considering the effect of defections 
on the party that has been left and more specifically, on MPs who decided to keep their label. Indeed, 
scholars have devoted less attention to the destiny of the parties and legislators that suffered defections 
(with a couple of exceptions: Heller and Mershon 2009b; Nokken 2000). 
Nokken (2000) compares the voting behaviour of switchers vis-à-vis non-switchers and records a 
considerable re-alignment of preferences among defectors. This realignment does not occur for those 
MPs who kept their own party label, even for the legislators ideologically close to the switchers. Heller 
and Mershon (2009b) do not look at individual MPs, but at the effect that switching has on parties’ unity 
in voting behaviour. According to these authors, preferences grow more heterogeneous when a party’s 
size increases thanks to switching. On the contrary, ideal points within out-switching parties should 
become more alike and this effect should be stronger, compared to receiving parties. 
In this regard, the present study aims to assess the impact of party switching on intra-party heterogeneity 
of the sending party (the one that suffer from defections). Instead of focusing on the overall effect within 
the party, we adopt an individual perspective. We pay attention to the self-positioning of individual 
politicians (rather than their voting behaviour) and, specifically, we look at the perceived distance 
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between politicians and their own party in the aftermath of party splits. This research question is both 
theoretically and empirically relevant. 
Indeed, divisions and parliamentary defections weaken sending parties in many ways. First, by reducing 
the size of a parliamentary party group, defections can decrease the margin of the ruling coalition, 
weakening its ability to enact policymaking or, conversely, they can damage the strength of the 
opposition, granting more leeway to the government. Additionally, defections can represent a challenge 
for the party leadership, which might be weakened due to an outbound flow of legislators. 
Second, defections are a stain on party’s reputation and can damage its valence endowment. Clark (2009: 
96) notes “unity can also be considered in valence terms, as again all would agree that voters prefer a 
unified party to a divided one. A party whose members publicly feud, for instance, will do little to inspire 
the public’s confidence that they can provide stable, effective leadership.” Additionally, from a valence 
point of view, switching also represents a threat to the chain of responsiveness, as it is very difficult to 
keep legislators accountable when they change label (Heller and Mershon 2009a), given that they adjust 
their voting behaviour and attitudes too. Consequently, parliamentary switches can be electorally 
damaging, like splits and intra-party divisions (Greene and Haber 2015; Ibenskas 2017); furthermore, 
switches can also seriously jeopardize party stability and institutionalization (McMenamin and Gwiazda, 
2011). Accordingly, it is also crucial to investigate what happens inside parties affected by out-switching, 
evaluating whether internal cohesion gets strengthened or not; cohesion, in fact, can affect electoral 
outcomes but also everyday policy-making or the likelihood of being involved in coalition governments 
(Ceron 2016). 
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2.2 Theory and hypotheses 
Given that defections and divisions can have serious consequences for the party as a whole (also in terms 
of payoffs related to policy, office and votes), we argue that the occurrence of party switching can be a 
traumatic experience that will also affect the behaviour of party leaders and politicians. 
How do parties and politicians react to such traumatic events? In principle, given that some dissidents 
have moved to another group, when drafting the new party list for the next election the party leadership 
can try to replace the defectors with new party candidates who are deemed to be more loyal. Accordingly, 
we can expect that, on average, party candidates will perceive themselves to be ideologically closer to 
the party line after the occurrence of large splits so that parties affected by defections will be less 
heterogeneous (Heller and Mershon 2009b).  
Beside this systemic effect, we contend that such traumatic events leave a strong impression in the minds 
of those politicians who remain in the party. The psychological literature on the black sheep effect 
(Marques and Paez 1994; Rullo et al. 2015) suggests that people tend to distance themselves from a 
defecting group members, as a form of group protection made in order to restore the subjective uniformity 
of the group affected by deviants, i.e. the switchers (Marques and Paez 1994). When group membership 
becomes salient, we observe assimilation to the group as members will defend it to preserve a positive 
social identity; the remaining group members can thus emphasize their distance from the deviants, by 
reaffirming their closeness to the group itself. 
In this regard, the event, together with the awareness of its potential damage in terms of party’s payoffs, 
leads politicians to over-emphasize their ideological closeness to the party line for reasons linked with 
party competition concerns, even though psychological mechanisms are at work too. Splits can be 
perceived as a menace to the party’s social identity (Sacchi et al. 2013); accordingly, as suggested by 
theories of social identity (Martocchia Diodati 2017; Tajfel 1982), and in line with the in-group 
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projection model (Sacchi et al. 2013), we claim that politicians who did not switch will tend to minimize 
the perceived differences between themselves and their in-group, i.e. the party to which they still belong. 
Qualitative analyses of party breakup report that in-group politicians (those who remained inside the 
party) perceive their group to be consonant with the old party identity and argue that the splinter group 
is dissonant with that identity (Sani and Reicher 1998). Therefore, we argue that a higher rate of 
defections brings remaining politicians to perceive themselves as ideologically close to their party, 
though this effect can be stronger for some subsets of politicians as we will discuss later. 
There are at least two reasons to expect greater closeness between politicians and their party after the 
split. One is related to the replacement of dissenters with new candidates who are assumed to be more 
loyal. Another reason has to do with the traumatic effect of defections. Politicians that are exposed to 
huge levels of switching can regard defection as a treason of the party’s community. In turn, this can 
generate indignation; the remaining politicians can feel scorn for their colleagues who have crossed the 
party line. In principle, groups can be subjected to a non-abandonment norm; members will ‘sink or 
swim’ jointly with the rest of the group. From this perspective, observing a member violating this norm 
and leaving the group increases the salience of this norm; other members want to communicate to the 
rest of the group that they distance themselves from this treason (Van Vugt and Hart 2004). This will 
reinforce their willingness to support the party, bringing them to report a heightened ideological closeness 
to the party position. From a black sheep effect perspective, incumbent MPs are also more identified with 
the parliamentary party group directly hurt by the switches and, therefore, their reaction should be harsher 
(Branscombe et al. 1993). 
If this latter pattern is prevailing, we should expect to observe a stronger effect of defections among 
politicians who directly experienced such trauma, namely among incumbent MPs (who served when the 
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defections took place), rather than among rookie (i.e., non-incumbent) candidates/legislators who might 
only have an indirect experience of defections.  
Conversely, incumbent MPs who dealt with these episodes of defection in the previous legislature and 
observed their colleagues leaving the party might harbour stronger levels of bitterness. This reinforces 
the awareness about the importance of party unity, as well as their social identification with the group 
(Ellemers et al. 2002), and strengthens their perceptions concerning the ideological closeness between 
them and the party2. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A higher rate of defections brings incumbent politicians to perceive themselves as 
ideologically closer to their party, compared to non-incumbents. 
 
Notwithstanding the existence of an alternative exit option (the one adopted by these colleagues), other 
potential dissenters could have made a different choice and, despite having concerns about the party line 
and the strategy proposed by the party leadership, decided to remain inside.  This can generate a tension 
between the ideological attitudes (disagreement) and past behaviour (the decision to stay inside) 
producing the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957): an uncomfortable state of tension 
that happens when a person’s cognitive and ideological perceptions are inconsistent with the choices 
taken in everyday life. This theory suggests that people will adjust their cognitions and beliefs in 
accordance to some discrepant act/behaviour in which they have engaged, and which are difficult to 
reconcile with their own beliefs (Hirschman 1970). We hypothesize that an analogous psychological 
mechanism applies also to politicians. 
In this regard, those potential defectors (dissatisfied with the party leader or with the nature of internal 
decision-making that are, consequently, potentially less loyal to the leadership and more willing to leave 
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the party) who have nevertheless decided to remain inside the party, will experience a state of dissonance 
and will resolve this, justifying their resolution in light of a strengthened ideological closeness to the 
group. Cognitive dissonance will push politicians to feel less distant from their party in order to resolve 
the discrepancy between beliefs and behaviour.  
This is also in line with a black sheep effect: Threatened by an association with the switchers, which 
could have been similar to them, potential defectors that chose to stay inside can fear retaliation and, as 
an individual protection strategy (Eidelman and Biernat 2003), they will try to distance themselves from 
the switchers by expressing the perception of a better match between their ideological position and that 
of the party.  
This effect will be stronger, the larger the share of rebels who actually left; the cognitive dissonance 
should be higher, given that most of the colleagues who retained similar dissenting views and were 
analogously dissatisfied with the party’s internal life, have left the group. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): A higher rate of defections brings less loyal politicians who opted to stay inside the 
party to perceive themselves as ideologically closer to their party, compared to more loyal colleagues. 
 
3. Data and operationalization 
We test our hypotheses using a new dataset that puts parliamentary switches in relation to the answers to 
elite surveys held after the defections. The information on party switching comes from an original dataset 
on all the inter-party movements that occurred in Western Europe from 1945 to 2015 (Volpi 2019). The 
details regarding the switches were retrieved from the parliamentary archives and statistical services of 
each country. Only when a movement was officially recorded in the parliamentary transcripts/archive 
have we included it in the dataset. In line with Heller and Mershon (2009a), we consider party splits, 
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mergers and start-ups as well as all cases in which an MP acquired the status of independent as instances 
of switching. This operationalization is particularly suitable for our research questions. 
Switches are combined with another source of data represented by two elite surveys: the Comparative 
Candidate Survey (CCS 2016, 2018) and the PartiRep MP Survey3. The CCS consists of cross-country 
post-electoral polls of candidates who ran for national assemblies. The goal of the survey is to gather 
information regarding the policy preferences of candidates, as well as their attitudes vis-à-vis their party. 
We first rely on CCS Module I and then, as a robustness check, we also investigate Module II. Overall, 
by matching CCS survey data with information on parliamentary switching, we analyse answers provided 
by up to 12,728 respondents from 12 countries in 22 different elections4. 
Similarly, PartiRep conducted an attitudinal survey among MPs. The survey was carried out between 
2009 and 2012. The response rate varies across countries, but the sample is still representative of the 
entire population of MPs (for details: Deschouwer et al. 2014). By matching PartiRep MP Survey data 
with information on parliamentary switching, we analyse answers provided by 528 respondents from 11 
countries5. 
In the empirical analysis we mainly focus on CCS because the number of observations is considerably 
higher here than in PartiRep MP Survey. However, as a robustness check, we want to assess the reliability 
of our findings on a different sample of politicians (though, interestingly, there is some overlap in terms 
of countries and years considered). PartiRep data were collected in an unrelated survey project (thereby 
controlling for potential measurement errors), and include a lower number of observations (this 
represents a more stringent test). Notice that some PartiRep questions are slightly different from CCS 
ones and therefore PartiRep data have been analysed separately. Below we provide information on the 
operationalization of our CCS variables (see Online Appendix for details on operationalization of 
PartiRep MP Survey data). 
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To test our hypotheses, we are interested in assessing to what extent politicians consider themselves 
distant from their party, and we focus solely on their self-perception of such distance. In this regard, 
survey data are perfectly suitable to record the perceived distance between candidates and their party, 
instead of any actual disagreement related to observable behaviour (such as parliamentary votes; for a 
similar view: Schumacher and Elmelund-Præstekær 2018).  
For this purpose, we compute the absolute difference6 between candidates’ self-placement on the left-
right spectrum and candidates’ placement of their party on the same spectrum. This variable, Ideological 
Distance, is our dependent variable. It ranges from 0 (no perceived distance between the candidate and 
the party) to 10 (the candidate and the party are on opposite sides of the spectrum). 
Our main independent variable, Defections, represents the percentage of MPs who switched over the 
total number of seats retained by that party during the previous legislative term. For instance, with respect 
to the surveys held in Germany after the 2005 elections, we put survey answers in relation to the 
percentage of switchers in the legislative term 2002-2005.  
The first hypothesis suggests that the effect of defections on the perceived distance between candidates 
and their party should be greater among those who were already MPs at the time of defections, as they 
directly experienced the detriment of divisions in the daily legislative policy-making. In order to account 
for this, we use the variable Incumbent from CCS, which establishes the value of 0 for non-incumbent 
candidates7 and 1 for incumbent candidates, and we examine it in interaction with Defections.  
The second hypothesis suggests that, due to cognitive dissonance, the effect of defections should be 
greater among those who are less loyal to the party leadership but who, despite this, decided to stay inside 
the party. Accordingly, we create an index of loyalty: Loyalty Score. This index is built through principal 
component analysis (see Online Appendix for details), based on the first component, and combines the 
answers to different questions related to the degree of loyalty toward the party leadership and agreement 
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with the party whip (for a related discussion on loyalty and agreement in candidate surveys: Close et al. 
2019). This variable ranges from -3 to +3; it retains lower values when respondents believe that the party 
leader is too powerful, intra-party decision making is an excessive top-down process, and MPs should be 
free to vote in parliament (independently from the party whip) following mainly own opinions, or at 
most, voters’ opinions, instead of the party line. Conversely, respondents receive a higher Loyalty Score 
when they believe that MPs should not be free to vote according to own opinions, but that they must 
follow the party line, not express concerns about the power of the party leader and not complain about 
the nature of intra-party decision making. To test H2 we then examine the interaction between Defections 
and Loyalty Score8.  
We control for some individual traits of the respondents. Specifically, given that gender might affect 
candidates’ reported level of disagreement (Close et al. 2019), we control for it through the dummy 
variable Gender, which assigns a value of 1 when a candidate is a male and 0 otherwise. Moreover, we 
also account for the political experience of candidates, measuring the years of experience within the party 
office; the variable Experienced also allows to detect which respondent belongs to the party leadership. 
 
4. Analysis and results 
We analyse data through a multilevel linear model with politicians nested in parties. The results are 
reported in Table 1. Three models are provided. The first one refers to CCS Module I; in the second we 
extend the analysis to include CCS Module II. Notice that, compared to Module I, in the second wave of 
CCS some questions were no longer asked. To account for this, in Model 2 we slightly change the 
operationalization of two variables: first, only one element of the Loyalty Score is still available in the 
new survey wave, therefore we measure loyalty through a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent 
believes that MPs should not be free to vote according to own opinions because they must always follow 
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the party line; second, to shed light on political experience, the variable Experienced becomes a dummy 
equal to 1 if the respondent held a national party office.  Finally, Model 3 replicates the analysis using 
PartiRep data. The sample of politicians in PartiRep is different from CCS; this allows us to make sure 
that our findings from CCS are not driven by unobserved factors that are specific to the CCS survey.  We 
can thereby control for potential measurement errors. Moreover, the observations available in PartiRep 
are considerably lower than those available in CCS. A smaller sample size represents a stringent test, 
given that statistical significance is more difficult to achieve. PartiRep and CCS are two different 
projects, therefore the variables of interest are not identical. This concerns in particular the Loyalty Score 
(still measured via principal component analysis, though on a slightly different set of questions) and the 
variable Experienced, which distinguishes politicians belonging to the party leadership. Nevertheless, we 
managed to maximise the similarities in order to measure and capture those concepts that are theoretically 
relevant for our argument (see the Online Appendix).  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Concerning H1, we notice that the coefficient of the interaction term between Defections and Incumbent 
is negative and statistically significant (at the 90% level of confidence) across all models. For instance, 
in Model 2 the marginal effect of Defections is approximately -0.003 (standard error: 0.001) when the 
candidate is a non-incumbent; conversely, when the candidate is an incumbent this effect becomes more 
than double and grows up to -0.008 (standard error: 0.002). This means that increasing defections by 10 
points (i.e., a one standard deviation growth) will decrease the Ideological Distance between a candidate 
and the party by 0.08 points when the candidate is an incumbent, which represents an 8% increase 
compared to the average Ideological Distance of respondents (equal to 0.989); conversely, when the 
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candidate is a non-incumbent, the expected effect is limited to 3% (compared to the average ideological 
distance). Interestingly, the effect magnitude seems much larger when focusing only on elected MPs, as 
in PartiRep (Model 3): here a 10-points increase in defections decreases the Ideological Distance by 0.42 
points for incumbents. These results provide support for our first hypothesis: the higher the percentage 
of defectors during the previous term, the smaller the perceived ideological distance between a remaining 
politician and her/his party, particularly for incumbents compared to non-incumbents who did not 
directly experienced detrimental switches. In this regard, defections of former colleagues appear as an 
exceedingly traumatic experience that produces a stronger impact among those who were already in 
parliament. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Turning to H2, we find support for the idea that – due to cognitive dissonance – detrimental divisions 
produce a larger effect on candidates who report a lower Loyalty Score. Figure 1, based on Model 1, 
displays the marginal effect of Defections on Ideological Distance. When the Loyalty Score is low, a 10-
percentage points increase in the share of switches reduces the perceived distance by 0.1 points (a 10% 
drop from the average Ideological Distance). This effect lessens as the Loyalty Score grows and the 
impact becomes no longer statistically significant among the most loyal candidates9. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Remarkably, Figure 2 (based on Model 3) confirms that the marginal effect of Defections on Ideological 
Distance is stronger (-0.153; standard error: 0.055) when the Loyalty Score is low, and narrows further 
as loyalty increases, becoming no longer statistically significant among the most loyal legislators. 
With respect to the control variables, in the CCS analyses we find that male candidates tend to report a 
greater distance (+0.07 points) compared to their female colleagues. This finding is in line with those of 
Close et al. (2019) who noted a very similar effect on the reported score of disagreement. Conversely, in 
PartiRep we notice that being experienced politicians in a leadership position decreases the self-perceived 
ideological distance by 0.2 points. 
Intriguingly, the effect magnitudes of these two controls are in line with (or not much higher than) the 
conditional effect of a one-standard deviation increase in Defections for incumbents or non-loyal 
respondents in CCS, and are lower if compared to the same results on PartiRep data. This indicates that 
the role of Defections is not trivial.  
To conclude, in the Online Appendix we report the results of additional robustness checks. In particular, 
we include additional party-level controls, such as party size (votes share), party age, party family, the 
ideological party position on the left-right scale and a dummy variable to discriminate between 
government and opposition parties (Schumacher and Elmelund-Præstekær 2018). In other robustness 
checks we limit our analysis to switches that occurred in the previous two years (with the idea that the 
traumatic effect of switching concerns only, or mainly, recent defections), we control for potential 
outliers and we minimize the number of missing observations by reducing the variables included in the 
analysis10. 
In addition, we run the analysis considering only a sub-sample of parties for which we have data related 
to repeated elections, in order to track them over time taking into account the evolution of intra-party 
heterogeneity (Carroll and Kubo 2019) after the out-switching; in these additional models we also keep 
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constant the lagged average level of internal disunity, i.e., the average perceived distance between 
respondents and their party. By doing that, we evaluate the effect of defections net of the ex-ante level 
of intra-party heterogeneity, which could have produced the switches: this partially attenuates the 
concerns about the out-switching of distant MPs as the only cause of the lower self-perceived distances. 
All the results of these additional analyses confirm our substantive findings. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The present paper investigated the consequences of intra-party divisions, focusing on parliamentary party 
switching. We argued that repeated defections are detrimental events and represent a trauma for 
politicians exposed to high levels of party disintegration. This can promote cohesion among politicians 
who decided to remain inside the party. In fact, made aware of the dangers linked with disunity, 
politicians might strengthen their own perceptions of proximity to the party.  
We hypothesized that this effect should be particularly strong for incumbents, who directly experienced 
disunity by observing the defections of their colleagues in the previous legislative term. Furthermore, 
these traumatic defections should produce even stronger consequences among politicians who are less 
loyal to the party and could have been considered as potential defectors in their own right. The decision 
to remain inside could, in fact, generate a tension between their attitudes (disagreement) and the actual 
behaviour (the decision to stay inside) producing a cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) that ultimately 
exaggerates their perception of proximity to their party11. These dissenting politicians have to self-
explain their choice to remain inside; as long as they cannot legitimize it based on their loyalty to the 
party leadership, they will self-explain such behavior focusing on the stronger perceived self-proximity 
to the party. Symmetrically, due to cognitive dissonance, defections can also strengthen the sense of 
loyalty among those politicians who remained inside but still perceive themselves as ideologically distant 
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from their party (see the analysis in the Online Appendix). In this regard, self-perceived ideological 
proximity and loyalty can be a substitute for each other in explaining the choice of a potential rebel MP 
who decided to remain inside the party. 
We tested our hypotheses using two elite surveys (CCS and PartiRep), collecting and analysing data 
related to a sample of 13,256 politicians belonging to 92 parties that ran in 28 elections held between 
2005 and 2015 in 14 countries. The results are in line with our expectations, suggesting that defections 
reinforce the sense of belonging for politicians who remain inside the party and this effect is stronger for 
both incumbents and for less loyal politicians who experience a stronger cognitive dissonance. 
Overall, it seems that after parliamentary switching, parties that suffer defections can become more 
cohesive. This is in line with the results reported by Heller and Mershon (2009b) that show how, during 
a legislative term, switches decrease heterogeneity inside the out-switching parties. Our analysis extends 
such findings, suggesting that it might apply also to intra-party cohesion in the following legislative term, 
at least with respect to the self-perception of candidates and representatives in terms of distance from the 
party line. If splits boost cohesion in parties, particularly among politicians that usually complain about 
party discipline, this can be taken as a good news in terms of accountability and responsiveness. In fact, 
to distinguish themselves from their contentious former colleagues, party candidates are more likely to 
toe the party line and respect the party platform in the following legislature. 
Arguably, there are other alternative explanations that potentially fit with our empirical findings. First, 
in parties affected by high levels of defections, the party leadership can try to select more loyal 
candidates, who, in turn, express a closer proximity between their ideological views and the party’s 
position. However, if the party leadership replaces defectors with new, more loyal candidates, we should 
have observed a stronger effect of defections among non-incumbent candidates rather than among 
incumbents, which is not the case. Furthermore, we also observed a stronger effect among candidates 
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who criticize the party leadership and complain about loyalty and discipline. This result cannot be 
explained by candidate selection (as the party leadership should try to select more loyal candidates) and 
points to a different theoretical mechanism. 
Second, due to the fear of sanctions, dissenting politicians will strategically answer survey questions and 
rescind their disagreement. However, the fear of retaliation should only play a limited role in anonymous 
surveys, as candidates will hardly be punished for expressing dissent in such surveys, compared to what 
might happen in case of public disagreement expressed in parliamentary votes and speeches or on social 
media (Ceron 2017).12  
In view of that, our empirical findings support the idea of defections as traumatic events that might alter 
intra-party cohesion and equilibrium by affecting the perceptions expressed by individual politicians. 
This paper has some limitations. The main one concerns the fact that we are analysing a cross-sectional 
survey and not a panel. However, the fact that our main independent variable, Defections, is external to 
survey data can at least partially limit this concern. Nevertheless, future research could try to establish a 
more direct link between political events related to party splits and changes in the attitudes of politicians. 
Even so, the present study has several implications for scholars working with elite surveys as it suggests 
that the viewpoints of respondents can be affected by the process of cognitive dissonance, and their 
answers can therefore be adjusted to match their past behaviour. Our findings can be a positive news for 
scholars working with elite surveys. The fact that we report similar results when analysing two different 
surveys is good news as it suggests that the two data collection processes align. 
Our paper also addresses an emerging stream of literature that investigates the links between political 
psychology and party politics, to explain the psychological aspects behind party mergers (Martocchia 
Diodati 2017; Sacchi et al. 2013) or the voter’s choice to exit from the party (Bakker et al. 2016). From 
this perspective, the results wield implications about the mechanisms linked with political accountability 
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and responsiveness. In fact, ethical norms (Orbell et al. 1984) and psychological elements seem to play 
a role in intra-party disagreement. If, for those who stay, observing someone switching reinforces the 
sense of belonging, then political institutions can foster non-abandonment norms (Van Vugt and Hart 
2004) to preserve party unity, thereby reducing political instability and strengthening the chain of 
responsiveness that extends from voters and parties to elected MPs. The present paper also addresses the 
wide literature on the black sheep effect (Marques and Paez 1994; Rullo et al. 2015), arguing that this 
effect can be expressed in terms of a stronger closeness between members of the threatened group, 
particularly when there is a direct identification with the threatened group (the parliamentary party group) 
and when individual politicians that can be somewhat associated with the defectors will try to distance 
themselves from the switchers (Eidelman and Biernat 2003). These mechanisms can also help parties to 
prevent a downward spiral, avoiding further waves of switching and limiting the electoral losses due to 
out-switching, by invoking (and highlighting) internal cohesion and coherence, while blaming the black 
sheep. 
Finally, this study can also be of interest to scholars investigating the effects of party splits as it suggests 
that intra-party division might have unexplored consequences, such as strengthening the sense of 
belonging of politicians who remain inside the party and the cohesion of the party itself. 
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Table 
 
Table 1 – Multilevel Regression of Ideological Distance 
 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 CCS (Module I) CCS (Module I & II) PartiRep 
        
Switchers -0.002 -0.006*** -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) 
Incumbent -0.167** -0.113* -0.054 
 (0.064) (0.046) (0.087) 
Switchers*Incumbent -0.005† -0.004† -0.034† 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.019) 
Loyalty Score -0.133*** -0.135*** -0.097** 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.033) 
Switchers*Loyalty Score 0.002* 0.007* 0.025* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.012) 
Experienced 0.002 -0.027 -0.201† 
 (0.004) (0.032) (0.113) 
Gender 0.072* 0.075** -0.042 
 (0.034) (0.028) (0.091) 
Constant 0.977*** 0.988*** 0.931*** 
 (0.043) (0.037) (0.059) 
    
Observations 3,610 6,674 528 
Number of parties 55 70 61 
R2 overall  0.03  0.01  0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Marginal Effect of Defections at different levels of Loyalty Score (CCS–Model 1) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Marginal Effect of Defections at different levels of Loyalty Score (PartiRep–Model 
3) 
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1 For a summary of studies on party switching: Mershon (2014), Mershon and Shvetsova (2014), 
Yoshinaka (2015). 
2 Arguably, the closer (perceived) proximity between politicians and their party can also be a by-product 
of the defections given that some dissenters, who presumably felt ideologically distant from it, have left. 
This concern will be addressed below. 
3 http://www.partirep.eu 
4 We analysed the following countries covered by CCS (election years are in parenthesis): Austria (2008), 
Belgium (2007, 2010, 2014), Denmark (2011), Finland (2011, 2015), Germany (2005, 2013), Greece 
(2007, 2009, 2012, 2015), Ireland (2007), Italy (2013), the Netherlands (2006), Norway (2009, 2013), 
Switzerland (2007, 2011, 2015) and the United Kingdom (2010). 
5 We analysed the following 11 countries: Austria (2008-2013), Belgium (2007-2010), France (2007-
2012), Germany (2009-2013), Ireland (2007-2012), Italy (2008-2013), the Netherlands (2006-2011), 
Norway (2005-2009), Spain (2008-2012), Switzerland (2007-2010) and the United Kingdom (2005-
2015). In parenthesis the years of the legislative terms covered by PartiRep. 
6 We are interested in the intensity of the distance (not in its direction). 
7 PartiRep is addressed to legislators and not to candidates; to account for this we compare legislators 
who served as MPs in the previous legislative term (incumbents), with rookie MPs (non-incumbents) 
that were elected for the first time in the following legislative term. 
8 We additionally investigated the impact of Defections conditional on intra-party democracy, based on 
party statutes (following Close et al. 2019) using data from the Political Party Database (Poguntke et al. 
2016). However, we did not find any moderating effect. All the other results hold the same even when 
controlling for intra-party rules. 
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9 Similarly, in Model 2 such negative effect amounts to -0.6 points for non-loyal respondents, while the 
impact is not statistically significant for loyal ones. 
10 Some questions were not asked in some countries. There is no information on experience in Austria 
and no data on incumbency in Austria and Ireland. Analogously, some questions included in the 
Loyalty Score were not asked in Austria and Germany (though this is of no concern in Model 2). In the 
Online Appendix we provide a different version of the Loyalty Score that contains fewer missing cases 
(the observations are 20% more than in Model 1). We also provide models without incumbency and 
experience (with the double of observations compared to Model 1, limiting missing cases to 22%). Our 
findings remain the same. 
11 This should not affect politicians that are already loyal and ideologically close to the party. 
12 The null conditional effect found for intra-party democracy further supports our argument. 
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Part 3: Effect on Loyalty as a dependent variable 
 
 
 
PART 1: DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
Table A1 – Descriptive Statistics CCS Module I 
Variable Mean sd Min Max Obs 
Ideological Distance 0.97 1.11 0 10 10998 
Ideological Distance 
(dichotomized) 
0.59 0.49 0 1 10998 
Defections 3.14 9.74 0 83 10581 
Loyalty Score 0.00 1.33 -3.1 3 7792 
Incumbent  0.08 0.27 0 1 9857 
Gender  0.66 0.47 0 1 13123 
Experienced 1.70 4.38 0 53 9343 
Government 0.45 0.50 0 1 10581 
Left-Right Position -5.39 21.13 -53.4 52 10565 
 Survey variables used to calculate Loyalty: 
d4a 1.50 0.50 1 2 10156 
d4b 1.34 0.47 1 2 10616 
d4c 1.34 0.47 1 2 10550 
d7a 3.46 1.23 1 5 10023 
d7b 2.62 1.19 1 5 9160 
d7c 3.48 1.15 1 5 9984 
 
Description of variables used to create Loyalty score: 
- D4a: “An MP in a conflict between the constituency voters the position of the party should 
follow: 1=party position 2=voter opinion”. 
- D4b: “An MP in a conflict between own opinion and the constituency voters should follow: 
1=own opinion 2=voter opinion”. 
- D4c: “A MP in a conflict between own opinion and the party position should follow: 1=own 
opinion 2=party position”. 
- D7a: “Intra-party decision making is too much top-down. 1=strongly agree 2=agree 3=neither 
4=disagree 5=strongly disagree”. 
- D7b: “MPs should be able to vote in parliament independently of their party’s position. 
1=strongly agree 2=agree 3=neither 4=disagree 5=strongly disagree”.  
  
- D7c: “The party leader is too powerful. 1=strongly agree 2=agree 3=neither 4=disagree 
5=strongly disagree”. 
 
Results of the Principal Component Analysis on CCS Module I 
This Loyalty index is built through principal component analysis (PCA), based on the first component 
(which explains almost 30% of the variance; eigenvalue equal to 1.763), and combines the answers 
to different questions related to the degree of loyalty toward the party leadership and agreement with 
the party whip. This variable ranges from -3 to +3; it retains lower values when respondents believe 
that the party leader is too powerful, intra-party decision making is an excessive top-down process, 
and MPs should be free to vote in parliament (independently from the party whip) following mainly 
own opinions, or at most, voters’ opinions, instead of the party line. Conversely, respondents receive 
a higher Loyalty Score when they believe that MPs should not be free to vote according to own 
opinions, but that they must follow the party line, not express concerns about the power of the party 
leader and not complain about the nature of intra-party decision making. Here are the results of the 
PCA: 
 
Tab A2- Principal Component 1 (CCS): Eigenvectors 
Variable Component 1 
D7c 0.369 
D7b 0.5587 
D7a 0.3306 
D4b 0.0383 
D4a -0.4194 
D4c 0.5148 
 
 
Table A3 – Descriptive Statistics CCS Module I & II 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Ideological Distance 10,998 0.97 1.11 0 10 
Ideological Distance 
(dichotomized) 
10,998 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Defections 10,581 3.13 9.74 0 83.34 
Loyalty Score 7,792 1.65 1.33 -3.07 3.12 
Incumbent  9,857 0.08 0.27 0 1 
  
Gender  13,123 1.34 0.47 1 2 
Experienced 9,343 1.64 4.36 0 53 
Government 10,581 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Left-Right Position 6,919 4.95 2.07 1 9.86 
Survey variables used to calculate Loyalty: 
d4a 10,156 0.50 0.50 0 1 
d4b 10,616 0.34 0.47 0 1 
d4c 10,550 0.34 0.47 0 1 
d7a 10,023 2.46 1.23 0 4 
d7b 9,160 1.62 1.19 0 4 
d7c 9,984 2.48 1.15 0 4 
 
 
Table A4 –Descriptive Statistics PartiRep 
 
Variable Mean sd Min Max Obs 
Ideological Distance 0.87 0.95 0 5 631 
Defections 0.92 3.01 0 33 685 
Incumbent  0.60 0.49 0 1 685 
Loyalty Score -0.00 1.40 -5.2 3 537 
Experienced  0.11 0.31 0 1 685 
Gender  0.34 0.47 0 1 685 
 Survey variables used to calculate Loyalty: 
v005 2.83 0.92 1 4 668 
v006 1.57 0.50 1 2 627 
v007 1.25 0.43 1 2 638 
v008 1.71 0.45 1 2 616 
v012_4 5.50 1.25 1 7 667 
v032_1 1.84 0.55 1 3 637 
v033_3 2.01 0.43 1 3 637 
v034_4 3.05 1.05 1 5 634 
 
Description of PartiRep Variables: 
- Ideological Distance: Absolute distance between a candidate’s self-placement on the left-
right scale and candidates’ placement of their party on the same scale. 
- Defections: percentage of defectors over the total amount of seat that each party witnessed 
during the previous legislative term. 
- Incumbent: dummy variable that takes value 1 when the candidate is an incumbent, 0 
otherwise (based on the variable Rookie, already provided in the survey). 
- Experienced: dummy variable that takes value 1 when MP is (deputy) speaker of Parliament, 
  
committee chair or PPG leader and 0 otherwise (based on the variable Leadpos, already 
provided in the survey). 
- Gender: dummy variable that takes value 1 when the candidate is a female, and 0 otherwise 
(based on the variable Sex, already provided in the survey). 
- Loyalty: this index is built through principal component analysis and combines the answers 
to different questions related to the degree of loyalty toward the party leadership and 
agreement with the party whip. This variable ranges from -5 to +3.5; it takes lower values 
when respondents often disagree with the party line (every month), when do not think it is 
important to promote the views and the interests of their party, when they think party 
discipline should be less strict (particularly with respect to sticking to the parliamentary party 
line in votes), and believe that MPs should follow mainly own opinions, or at most voters’ 
opinions, instead of the party line in parliamentary votes. Conversely, respondents get a higher 
Loyalty score when MPs never disagree with the party line, when they believe that MPs 
should not be free to vote according to own opinions but must follow the party line, when 
they feel it is important to promote the views and the interests of their party, and when they 
think party discipline should be stricter (particularly with respect to sticking to the 
parliamentary party line in votes). For this purpose, the following PartiRep variables have 
been used: “v005”, “v006”, “v007”, “v008”, “v012_4”, “v032”, “v033_3”, “v034_4”. 
- v005: Categorical variable, based on the question: “How often, in the last year, would you say 
you have found yourself in the position that your party had one opinion on a vote in 
Parliament, and you personally had a different opinion? 1: about once a month; 2: about every 
three months; 3: about once a year; 4: (almost) never”.  
- v006: Categorical variable, based on the question: “And how should, in your opinion, a 
Member of Parliament vote in this situation? 1: MP should vote according to his/her own 
opinion; 2: MP should vote according to his/her party’s opinion”. 
- v007: Categorical variable, based on the question: “And, how should, in your opinion, a 
Member of Parliament vote if his/her own opinion on an issue does not correspond with the 
opinion of his/her voters? 1: MP should vote according to his/her own opinion;2: MP should 
vote according to the opinion of his/her voters”. 
- v008: Categorical variable, based on the question: “How should, in your opinion, a Member 
of Parliament vote if his/her voters have one opinion and his/her party takes a different 
position? 1: MP should vote according to the opinion of his/her voters; 2: MP should vote 
according to his/her party’s opinion”. 
- v012_4: Categorical variable based on 7-point scale related on the question: “How important 
  
is it to you, personally, to promote the views and interests of your party?” (1: of no importance; 
7: of great importance). 
- v032: Categorical variable based on the question: “Generally speaking, what is your opinion 
about party discipline in your parliamentary party? Should it be stricter than it is now, should 
it remain as it is, or should it be less strict than it is now? 1: should be stricter; 2: should remain 
as it is; 3: should be less strict”.  
- v033_3: Categorical variable based on the question: “More specifically, what is your opinion 
about party discipline in your parliamentary party when it comes to sticking to parliamentary 
party line in votes? 1: should be stricter; 2: should remain as it is; 3: should be less strict”. 
- v034_4: Categorical variable based on 5-point scale related the question: “Members of 
Parliament face tough choices every day in their job. Presented below are a few of those 
choices you may face. For each of them, we would like to ask you for your opinion as to 
which choice a Member of Parliament should make. 1: A Member of Parliament should resist 
the demands of other interests and keep to the party line. 5: A Member of Parliament should 
be prepared to accommodate the demands of other interests.” 
 
 
Results of the Principal Component Analysis on PartiRep 
The Loyalty index is built through principal component analysis (PCA), based on the first component 
(which explains more than 24% of the variance; eigenvalue equal to 1.947). Here are the results of 
the PCA: 
 
Table A5 - Principal Component 1 (PartiRep): Eigenvectors 
Variable Component 1 
v005 0.3483 
v006 0.4615 
v007 0.2157 
v008 0.3596 
v034_4* 0.3064 
v032 -0.2531 
v033_3 -0.3901 
v012_4 0.424 
*NOTE: before running the PCA this variable has been reversed so that higher values indicate that 
MPs are more willing to keep the party line 
 
 
 
 
  
PART 2: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
 
2.1 Reducing missing cases 
 
Some questions were not asked in some countries; for instance, there is no information on experience 
in Austria and no data on incumbency in Austria and Ireland. Analogously, some questions included 
in the Loyalty Score were not asked in Austria and Germany. For this purpose, we provide a different 
version of the Loyalty Score (mean:2.45 std. dev.:1.23) that contains fewer missing cases (for 
instance, in Model 2 below the observations are 20% more than in first model of Table A6, which 
corresponds to Model 1 in the main text). In the Model 3 below, in order to maximize the number of 
observations we also discard incumbency and experience (which contains many missing cases): this 
model has the double of observations compared to Model 1, and the missing here only represent 22% 
of the total (which is the minimum amount given the main independent variables that we want to 
test). All the findings remain the same. 
 
Table A6 - Multilevel Regression of Ideological Distance with a Different Operationalisation of 
Loyalty 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CCS 
(Module I) 
CCS 
(Module I) 
CCS  
(Module I) 
     
Switchers -0.002 -0.008+ -0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loyalty -0.133*** -0.186*** -0.180*** 
 (0.018) (0.02) (0.02) 
Switchers*Loyalty 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) 
Incumbent -0.167** -0.160***  
 (0.064) (0.05)  
Switchers*Incumbent -0.005+ -0.004*  
 (0.003) (0.00)  
Experienced 0.002 0.001  
 (0.004) (0.00)  
Gender 0.072* 0.060* 0.085*** 
 (0.034) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.977*** 1.394*** 1.332*** 
 (0.043) (0.0636) (0.06) 
    
Observations 3,610 4,314 6,865 
Number of party_code 55 55 68 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
 
 
  
2.2 – Parties in multiple waves 
 
In this sub-section we run the analysis considering only a sub-sample of parties for which we have 
data related to repeated elections, in order to track them over time taking into account the evolution 
of intra-party heterogeneity after the out-switching; in two of these additional models (Model 2 and 
3) we also keep constant the lagged average level of internal disunity, i.e., the average perceived 
distance between respondents and their party. All the results of these additional analyses confirm our 
substantive findings. Interestingly, controlling for the average level of internal disunity suggests that 
defections do affect the self-perceived closeness to the party, net of the ex-ante level of intra-party 
heterogeneity. 
 
 
Table A7 – Multilevel Regression of Ideological Distance (only parties in multiple waves) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES CCS 
(Module I) 
CCS 
(Module I) 
CCS  
(Module I & II) 
        
Switchers -0.001 -0.002 -0.005** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Incumbent  -0.206* -0.107 -0.119* 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) 
Switchers*Incumbent -0.005* -0.006* -0.006** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender  0.054 0.043 0.042 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Loyalty -0.150*** -0.149*** -0.116** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Switchers*Loyalty 0.003** 0.004*** 0.008* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Experienced  0.000 -0.013* -0.022 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) 
Average_disunity (t-1)  -0.145 0.240+ 
  (0.20) (0.14) 
Constant 1.056*** 1.303*** 0.780*** 
 (0.05) (0.22) (0.16) 
    
Observations 2,596 1,262 3,940 
Number of parties 30 20 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2.3 – The role of outliers 
 
 
As we can notice from the graph below (A1), our main independent variable (Switchers) is skewed. 
In principle, a skewed explanatory variable is not a problem in linear regression, if this does not 
violate the assumption that residuals are normally distributed and if there are no observations with a 
huge leverage that can influence the results. In this regard, we tried to control for outliers and 
potentially influential observations. To cope with this, the optimal solution would be to control for 
them. From a leverage versus residuals plot ran after an OLS, we noticed that there are no 
observations that have at the same time a huge residual and a high leverage. Nevertheless, some 
observations had a wide leverage or a large residual. These cases refer mostly to the Greek party 
Syriza, to the Danish party New Alliance and to the Belgian party New Flemish Alliance, which are 
the cases with a highest level of switches. Table A8 below displays the results of the analyses in 
which we control for these potentially influential observations. As we can notice from the table A8, 
all the results remain the same. 
Notice that an alternative solution would be to transform the variable, for instance taking the square 
root. If we do this, all the results remain the same, but the variable remains skewed (as can be seen 
from the picture A2 below). Notice that this happens also with other potential transformations: the 
variable tends to remain skewed (see picture A2 below). Overall, it would not be possible to take the 
logarithm of the variable due to the presence of several observations with a value equal to zero, but 
even if we assign a figurative value different from zero to the observations with a value equal to zero 
and we take the log, the variable remains skewed as it was before (and as it happens with the other 
transformation) and all the marginal effects remain the same. In light of this, we decided to control 
for potentially influential observations keeping the original variable, as in table A8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure A1 – Distribution of the variable Switchers 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2 – Potential transformation of the variable Switchers 
 
 
 
 
Table A8- Multilevel Regression of Ideological Distance (controlling for outliers) 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES CCS  
(Module I & II) 
CCS  
(Module I & II) 
CCS  
(Module I & II) 
    
Switchers -0.002 -0.006+ -0.006*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loyalty -0.142*** -0.185*** -0.133*** 
  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Switchers*Loyalty 0.002 0.001** 0.006+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Incumbent -0.081 -0.084 -0.078 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.0576) 
Switchers*Incumbent -0.032 -0.032+ -0.027 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Experienced -0.001 0.001 -0.035 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Gender 0.068* 0.060* 0.070** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Outliers 3.313 3.499 3.039 
 (2.28) (2.29) (2.14) 
    
Constant 1.036*** 1.385*** 1.081*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
    
Observations 3,610 4,314 6,674 
Number of parties 55 55 70 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
2.4 – Additional Controls 
 
In this sub-section we control for party-level variables, such as party size (votes share), party age, 
party family, the ideological party position on the left-right scale (based on the widely used RILE 
scale provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project – Marpor) and a dummy variable to 
discriminate between government and opposition parties. These additional party-level control 
variables can help to reduce potential confoundedness. Remarkably, our results hold the same even 
when controlling for these party-level variables. 
 
 
Table A9- Multilevel Regression of Ideological Distance with additional party-level controls 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES CCS  
(Module I) 
CCS  
(Module I) 
CCS  
(Module I & II) 
Switchers 0.000 -0.005 -0.004* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Incumbent  -0.211*** -0.214*** -0.173*** 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Switchers*Incumbent -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loyalty Score -0.128*** -0.162*** -0.141*** 
  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Switchers*Loyalty 0.003*** 0.002** 0.007** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Experienced  0.002 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Gender  0.079** 0.073*** 0.072** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
% Vote 0.007** 0.005 0.006 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Party family (r.c. Green)    
Radical Left -0.355*** -0.491*** -0.335*** 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) 
Social-Democrats -0.121 -0.285 0.017 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.12) 
Liberals -0.197* -0.319** -0.072 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) 
Christian-Democrats -0.083 -0.214 0.081 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) 
Conservative -0.371*** -0.523*** -0.150 
 (0.13) (0.20) (0.11) 
Radical Rights -0.129 -0.314 -0.021 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.10) 
Regionalist -0.150 -0.262 -0.079 
 (0.18) (0.23) (0.16) 
Left-Right 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government 0.030 0.019 0.005 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Tenure 0.002 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.977*** 1.415*** 0.990*** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.07) 
    
Observations 3,474 4,166 6,250 
Number of parties 54 54 61 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
In Model 2 we use the operationalization of Loyalty with less missing cases 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2.5 – Defections in the last 2 years before elections 
 
Following the idea that the traumatic effect of switching concerns only, or mainly, recent defections, 
in this sub-section, as a robustness check, we limit our analysis to switches that occurred in the 
previous two years (mean: 1.82 std. dev.: 8.11). We notice that our findings remain the same. 
 
 
Table A10 – Multilevel Regression of Ideological Distance using the percentage of switchers in last 
2 years before elections 
 
 Model 1  
VARIABLES CCS  
(Module I & II) 
   
Switchers 0.006** 
 (0.00) 
Loyalty 0.132** 
 (0.02) 
Switchers*Loyalty 0.008** 
 (0.00) 
Incumbent  0.118** 
 (0.04) 
Switchers*Incumbent -0.004+ 
 (0.00) 
Experienced  -0.027 
 (0.03) 
Gender  0.074** 
 (0.03) 
Constant 0.976** 
 (0.04) 
  
Observations 6,674 
Number of parties 70 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
PART 3: EFFECT ON LOYALTY AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
 
Beside affecting the self-perceived distance of politicians, from a theoretical perspective the cognitive 
dissonance could also produce a symmetric effect on loyalty. In fact, we argued that dissenting 
politicians have to self-explain their choice to remain inside; as long as they cannot legitimize it based 
on their loyalty to the party leadership, they will self-explain such behavior focusing on the stronger 
perceived self-proximity to the party. Symmetrically, due to cognitive dissonance, defections can also 
strengthen the sense of loyalty among those politicians who remained inside but still perceive 
themselves as ideologically distant from their party. In this regard, we double check our theoretical 
framework testing this expectation in Table A11 below. Indeed, we notice that a higher rate of 
switchers increases the loyalty of the remaining politicians, though mainly among those that self-
perceived themselves as more distant from the party position. The greater their self-perceived 
distance, the higher the impact of defections on loyalty. In line with the expectation, this is perfectly 
symmetrical compared to the impact of defections on ideological distance. In this regard, self-
perceived ideological proximity and loyalty can be a substitute for each other in explaining the choice 
of a potential rebel MP who decided to remain inside the party. 
 
 
Table A11 – Models of Loyalty  
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
VARIABLES CCS  
(Module I & II) 
CCS  
(Module I) 
   
Switchers -0.009+ -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Incumbent -0.291** -0.028 
 (0.10) (0.07) 
Ideological Distance -0.131** -0.169** 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
Switchers*Ideological Distance 0.005* 0.003* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender  -0.159** -0.156** 
 (0.06) (0.04) 
Experienced  0.059 0.003 
 (0.07) (0.01) 
Constant -0.173 0.501** 
 (0.14) (0.09) 
   
Observations 6,674 3,610 
  
Number of parties 70 55 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
Figure A3 – Marginal Effects of Defections for different levels of Ideological Distance (Model 1, 
Table A11)  
 
 
 
 
Figure A4 – Marginal Effects of Defections for different levels of Ideological Distance (Model 2, 
Table A11) 
 
 
 
 
